The material posted on the Internet at midnight Wednesday (November 30, 2005) included one of the largest collections of secret, intercepted communications ever made available for study.
The most provocative document is a 2001 article in which an agency historian argued that the agency's intelligence officers "deliberately skewed" the evidence passed on to policymakers on the crucial question of whether North Vietnamese ships attacked U.S. destroyers on August 4, 1964. Based on the mistaken belief that such an attack had occurred, President Lyndon Johnson ordered air strikes on North Vietnam, and Congress passed a broad resolution authorizing military action.
The historian, Robert Hanyok, wrote the article in an internal publication, and it was classified top secret despite the fact that it dealt with events in 1964. Word of Hanyok's findings leaked to historians outside the agency, who requested the article under the Freedom of Information Act in 2003.
Some intelligence officials said they believed the article's release was delayed because the agency was wary of comparisons between the roles of flawed intelligence in the Vietnam War and the war in Iraq. Hanyok declined to comment on Wednesday. But Don Weber, an agency spokesman, denied that any political consideration was involved.
"There was never a decision not to release the history" written by Hanyok, Weber said. On the contrary, he said, the release was delayed because the agency wanted to make public the raw material Hanyok used for his research.
"The goal here is to allow people to wade through all that information and draw their own conclusions," he said.
Thomas Banton, director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University, called the release of the document "terrific," noting that the eavesdropping material known as signal intelligence, or sigint, is the most secret information the government has.
"NSA may be the most close-mouthed of all U.S. government agencies," said Blanton, whose organization has published on the Web many collections of previously secret documents. "The release of such a large amount of sigint is unprecedented."
In his 2001 article, an elaborate piece of detective work, Hanyok wrote that 90 percent of the intercepts of North Vietnamese communications relevant to the supposed August 4, 1964 attack were omitted from the major agency documents going to policymakers.
"The overwhelming body of reports, if used, would have told the story that no attack had happened," he wrote. "So a conscious effort ensued to demonstrate that an attack occurred."
Edwin Moise, a historian at Clemson University who wrote a book on the Gulf of Tonkin incident, said the agency did the right thing in making public Hanyok's damning case. "A lot of people at the agency haven't been happy that communications intelligence was used to support a wrong conclusion," he said.
Agency employees worked late Wednesday to meet a self-imposed end-of-November deadline, posting
the intercepts, oral history interviews with retired agency officials and internal reports on the
agency's Web site at
New York Times